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Abstract

The world changed after 9/11, and so did the US banking regulations. One change
was that it has become increasingly difficult for families and communities in Somalia to
receive remittances from relatives and friends living in the United States. Those funds are
essential to the livelihoods of 40% of the population, especially women and children. It
further has a negative impact on the national economy of one of the world’s poorest
countries. However, US banks has become increasingly willing to assume the costs of
complying with the government’s Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of
Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations or to risk the penalties for failing to meet those
regulations. The problem grew to crisis levels in 2011, as the country was experiencing a
devastating drought. At that point, Oxfam America, responding to requests from its local
development partners, agreed to use its well-developed policy research and advocacy
capacity in an effort to resolve the problem. This case study documents, evaluates and
draws lessons from the first three years of Oxfam’s ongoing campaign on remittances into
Somalia.
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Introduction

In the midst of World War II, 1942, and in response to the plight of refugees in
Greece, a group of Quaker intellectuals, social activists, and Oxford academics formed the
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, which later became known as Oxfam (from the words
Oxford and Famine.) Oxfam America (OUS) was founded in 1970 in Washington, DC by a
group of volunteers in response to the crisis in Bangladesh with a loan from Oxfam Great
Britain. OUS relocated to Boston 1973 (Inside Oxfam America, 2015).
Oxfam America is a humanitarian and development International NonGovernmental Organization (INGO) that strives to find lasting solutions to hunger, poverty,
and injustice. OUS is part of the 17 Oxfam confederation affiliates. Oxfam America
envisions a just world without poverty, as they believe that poverty is solvable. OUS
believes that the best approach is to look for the conditions that cause poverty. OUS’s work
falls into four main categories: saving lives, overcoming poverty and injustice, campaigning
for social justice, and promoting public (Inside Oxfam America, 2015). This approach has
allowed OUS to achieve a global reach and build a positive public image.
For many years, Oxfam has been campaigning and advocating to raise and amplify
the voices of the voiceless. The Worldwide Influencing Network (WIN) is a new Oxfam
strategic plan that aims at reallocating resources towards country teams to do more policy
advocacy work, since they have primary legitimacy in their own countries to do so. It is
hoped that WIN becomes a more holistic influencing model focused on the power,
attitudes, and beliefs that underlie poverty and injustice. Thus, in its new Strategic Plan,
National Influencing Guidelines (2013) by Oxfam International indicates:
By 2020, Oxfam will have contributed to achieve more profound and lasting change
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in the lives of people living with poverty and injustice. We will have done this at a
far greater scale by creating a world-wide influencing network (WIN) of One
Program teams, united by a common vision for change, adequately resourced, able
to use the full range of influencing techniques at their disposal, and actively
participating in a wider movement to fight against the injustice of poverty. (p. 6)

There are three approved priorities for the first phase of WIN by Oxfam’s Executive
Directors (EDs):
1. Achieving a giant leap forward in national-level influencing in the South;
2. Strengthening people’s voices and mobilising for impact in the digital age;
3. Strengthening Oxfam’s position as a thought leader (National Influencing
Guidelines, 2013, p. 7).

This in-depth case study was initiated for OUS Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
(MEL) Team that supports the WIN strategy. The research was conducted during my sixmonth fellowship as a Policy Influence Evaluation Fellow in that Team, from September
2014 to February 2015. WIN documents campaigns primarily for internal use as well as
publishes some of them for the wider audience. This in-depth case study was based on a
protocol designed in collaboration with SIT Graduate Institute Professor Jeff Unsicker.
During my fellowship, I wrote five short case studies. They capture a synopsis of the
campaigns, including a clear picture of the campaign’s goals, methods, results, and lessons
learned. The lessons are shared with the campaign team and other campaigning teams to
reflect upon and utilize. In fact, it is this process of reflection and learning that fulfill the
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‘learning’ component of the MEL.
As I have observed, there is an increased effort within WIN to bolster the advocacy
capacity of country teams that tend to involve influencing International/US policies. This
in-depth case study is an example of how local organizations can engage Oxfam when it is
necessary to influence international/US policies that are impacting people’s lives. At other
times, it specifically focuses on the country level, with little to no involvement of
international/US policies. For instance, as part of the global GROW campaign, I wrote two
case studies—one on Cambodia and the other on Colombia— targeted at corporations’
practices that impact poor people’s lives. Cargill, Land and Power in Colombia (see
appendices) is a case where three Oxfam affiliates worked with Colombia’s country team
and other local organizations to stop a bill the Colombian government was preparing to
present to the Congress. The bill was designed to facilitate and legalize large-scale
concentration of land intended for small farmers.
Methodology
This case study is based on a research protocol prepared in collaboration between
Oxfam America and SIT Graduate Institute that sets out guidelines for conducting in-depth
case studies on influencing work. It is intended to support the documentation of
influencing work conducted by Oxfam staff in-country and in the United States in support
of country priorities. Basically, case studies aim to provide a learning process to support
Oxfam’s ambition to build a Worldwide Influencing Network (WIN). This case study is
based on semi-structured interviews conducted with the Somalia Remittance/
Humanitarian team who worked in the campaign and other stakeholders including the
Policy Advisor, Campaign Manager, Communication Staff, Coordinators, Congressman Staff
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and Somali diaspora representatives. The interviews took place in January 2015, and they
were conducted via phone, Skype, and in person with some follow-up questions via email.
The case study also draws on secondary resources and internal documents provided by the
Campaign Team. The protocol has 13 sections (see appendices). Due to the unavailability of
any official M&E for the campaign, the paper will briefly discuss M&E as per Oxfam National
Influencing Guidelines. One of these sections, Impact, is beyond the scope of this paper. On
the other hand, Effectiveness, Outcomes and Contribution will be discussed jointly in one
heading.
The process of writing case studies is straightforward. Data is collected from
existing documents about the campaign. Those documents were given to me along with a
cover page—a paragraph describing the campaign, key documents, and key people to
interview if needed. In some cases, interviews were conducted, especially for this case, and
on other cases internal documents and/or a longer case study were sufficient. In all cases,
however, Senior Campaigns Coordinator and Campaign Manager revise the document and
add or edit some of the information. After I go over those edits, I will send it back for a final
approval and then send it to the Senior Campaigns Coordinator to post it on Padare, OUS’s
internal website. For the Somalia Remittances case, OUS Policy & Campaign Evaluation
Manager, and Sustainable Development Chair at SIT Graduate Institute, revised the drafts
(see appendices).
When I started reading and drafting Somalia Remittances case, I felt very connected
with the issue and the campaign as a whole as a Yemeni. First, Yemen has a sea border with
Somalia, and both countries have many cultural and traditional commonalities. Many
Yemeni tribes migrated to Somalia and formed communities there long time ago. During
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the Somali Civil War, a great number Somalis sought refuge in Yemen. But above all, putting
Yemeni-Americans in the shoes of Somali-Americans who are unable to support their
families in Yemen financially made me feel devastated. I decided to know more about this
remittances campaign, and so I discussed it with my fellowship supervisor at OUS and my
academic advisor at SIT. We agreed to pilot-test the in-depth case study protocol on the
same campaign. I wrote the Terms of Reference and identified key individuals to interview
in January 2015. I conducted all the eight interviews and wrote the first three of the 13
sections of the protocol from January to February 2015. I went back to school but
continued writing the case in the Course-Linked Capstone category as a partial fulfillment
of my MA degree in Sustainable Development from SIT Graduate Institute.
Context
The Republic of Somalia is one of the countries of the Horn of Africa. It is bordered
to the north by the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti to the northwest, to west by Ethiopia, the Indian
Ocean to the east and Kenya to the southwest. It occupies a total area of 637, 657 sq. km,
almost five times the size of Alabama; slightly smaller than Texas. The population comes to
10 million in 2014 with total GDP of US$ 5.8 billion, US$ 600 per capita. Muslims constitute
about 99.8% of the population, the majority of whom belong to the Sunni branch of Islam
(The World FactBook, 2015). Somali and Arabic are the official languages spoken in
Somalia.
The Civil War that broke out in 1990 and the subsequent violent conflicts led to the
state being classified as a failed state with no functional government since 1991. This war
also ensued the flourishing of extremist groups such as Al-Shabab. The current form of
government is federal parliamentary republic.
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The first Somalis to arrive in the United States were sailors who came in the 1920s
and settled in New York. The largest immigration to the US from Somalia, and to other
countries, was during the 1990 Somali Civil War. Estimates of the Somali diaspora in the US
according to the World Bank data is 100 thousand, concentrated in Minnesota, Ohio, New
York, Washington states. According to Global Migrant Origin Database, the number of
remittance senders from the US is 56,286 who approximately between remit $200 - $400
million annually into Somalia, an amount comparable to US development and humanitarian
aid to the country ($242 million) in 2012 (as cited in Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 9).
During the drought and food crisis of 2011 in Somalia, the worldwide Somali
diaspora played a key role in helping their families survive through remittances. Somalis
around the world remit about $1.3 billion dollars a year into Somalia, an average amount
that exceeds the total world humanitarian assistance in 2012 (861 million) "a year in which
donors provided Somalia with an unusually high amount of money to aid recovery from the
2011 drought” (Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 10). Remittances are not only important to
the improvement of the Somali wellbeing, but also crucial to lifting the Somali economy
since it is the "largest or second largest economy after telecommunication" (OUS Senior
Humanitarian Advisor, Personal Communication, January 2015). Somaliland officials told
Oxfam that remittances constitute 25-40 percent of its GDP (Orozco and Yansura, 2013).
Hence, the continuation of remittances into Somalia is essential to recover from the
protracted humanitarian, economic, and political crises.
Account closures began to affect Somali-American MTOs as early as 1990 and spiked
in the years following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. While
there are legitimate security concerns that money transfers could support violent and
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extremist groups in Somalia, there is strong evidence these remittances allow Somali
civilian recipients to spend them based on their needs and priorities, such as food, shelter,
healthcare, sending children to school, setting up small businesses, and investing in
communities. Remittances to women, in particular, result in investments in education,
health, and nutrition. These funds further support community resilience, prevent violent
extremism, and reduce the need for international humanitarian assistance. The remittance
system also plays an essential part in funding humanitarian operations in Somalia, which
use remittances to their in-country teams for operational costs such as staff salaries and
program costs, i.e. cash transfers and cash for work programs.
Somali-American money transfer operators (MTOs) play a central role in the
remittance process, providing the service of transferring cash from the US diaspora to
recipients throughout Somalia. Somali-American MTOs require US bank accounts to
facilitate transfers. Somali-American MTOs have invested in compliance systems, policies,
and training to adhere to US Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism (CFT) regulations. Nevertheless, US banks have branded Somalia as a highrisky destination and have closed MTOs’ bank accounts at twice the rate of closures of Latin
American MTO accounts, without providing specific justifications.
The Advocates
1. Oxfam America (OUS)
Oxfam America (OUS) is a global organization working to right the wrongs of
poverty, hunger, and injustice. OUS is one of 17 members of the international Oxfam
confederation, which works with people in more than 90 countries to create lasting
solutions. OUS's vision is "a just world without poverty"(Oxfam America, 2015). OUS is one
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of the few INGOs that have a hybrid model to development. That is, it not only seeks to
solve poverty through program implementation, but also researches reasons that
perpetuate poverty and designs campaigns to influence decision makers, including
government officials and the private sector. OUS has a long history of advocacy and
influencing work in the US and abroad. OUS’s influencing work spans from climate change,
food, agriculture, livelihood, aid effectiveness, private sector engagement, resilience, active
citizens and accountable states, disaster & conflict, gender justice, to resource rights and
trade.
OUS is a well-established humanitarian INGO that works in both development
programs and policy advocacy. It has a great capacity and well-qualified staff. OUS has
approximately 450 staff of whom around 100 work in Policy and Campaigns division, 225
in Programs division, 35 in Executive office and operations (HR/IT/Finance) division and
90 in Communications and Fundraising division. (OUS Global Staffing and HR Operations
Manager)
Oxfam has worked with local Somali organizations to implement projects on the
ground in Somalia for 40 years. With 4 million people in crisis during the drought in 2011,
Oxfam worked through local partners to provide water and sanitation, emergency food
security and livelihoods, and nutrition interventions to hundreds of thousands of people
affected by conflict and drought. Through local partners Oxfam has assisted over 1.5
million people in Somalia with some form of assistance since the food crisis response
started on July 1, 2011 (East Africa food crisis Oxfam’s response in Somalia until Dec. 16,
2011).
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This strong relationship and trust that Oxfam has built with local organizations
encouraged local partners to ask OUS to get involved when those organizations were
alarmed by the closures of Money Transfer Operators by US banks. OUS began its work on
remittances to Somalia in December 2011 to prevent the potential threat this remittance
cut-off poses on the livelihood of the Somali families.
The initial exploration of the issue and trips within the US and Somalia by OUS
Policy Advisor along with further conversion with Degan Ali, Adeso chair, who expressed
her concern about the accounts closures and emphasized the importance of remittances to
Somalia, made it clear that OUS has to get involved in the issue. At this point, the
humanitarian team decided to fund research and Adeso agreed to participate in the
research to gain a comprehensive picture of the remittance issue and possible solutions
culminating in the research report Keeping the Lifeline Open in June 2013. The research was
conducted by the Inter-American Dialogue and co-branded by OUS and Adeso. The report
gives a clear overview of how Somalia remittances work and outlines clear
recommendations to banks, US policy makers, MTOs, US government officials, and Somali
authorities in order to ensure the continued flow of remittances to Somalia while
addressing genuine security concerns.
It is important to note that Oxfam is currently the only US-based humanitarian
organization actively working on remittances within the US. Although CARE and World
Vision have worked on remittances in Somalia and in the UK, only Oxfam America works on
remittances in the US. Oxfam contributes policy expertise and plays a convening role
between the US and Somali government officials, the private sector, and the Somali
diaspora.
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2. African Development Solutions (Adeso)
Adeso is a humanitarian and development NGO with a long history of working in
Somalia. Originally founded by Fatima Jibrel in 1991 as the Horn of Africa Relief and
Development Organization in Connecticut, USA, Adeso has a bottom-up approach to
development in Africa and they envision " an Africa that is not dependent on aid, but on the
resourcefulness and capabilities of its people" (Adeso, n.d.). Adeso is well-placed to fulfill
this vision as an insider African organization with credibility and strong bonds with African
communities. Adeso has been working with African communities for over 20 years to
improve the community's wellbeing in such areas as the environment, society and finance.
Adeso's work can be broken down into four areas, which are “a) Developing skills for life
and work, b) Providing humanitarian aid, c) Reinvigorating the economy and d) Influencing
policy” (Adeso, n.d.).
Policy
Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) play a central role in the remittance chain. The
system is centralized and falls under two groups:
The first group of agents work exclusively for one MTO as salaried staff and/or receive
some commission based on the volume of transactions they handle. The second group is
composed of independent agents who have contractual relationships with one or more
MTOs and who are responsible for their own operating costs. According to interviews with
MTO agents and executives in Somalia, most agents work exclusively for one MTO. (Orozco
and Yansura, 2013, p. 13)
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Based on interviews conducted for the report, Somali-American MTOs focus on
building trust and relationships, and both agents and customers identified trust as the key
to successful money transfer business in Somalia. According to a Somali Imam, “mutual
trust is an essential component of Islamic law, and, by extension, of Islamic financial
services” (Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 13).
MTO executives also noted that Islamic law
and reputational concerns require that MTOs
avoid doing business with known criminals.
As one agent in Somalia explained:
Our reputation is at the core of our
business success; our ability to attract
good employees and customers is
dependent on our reputation
remaining intact. Even if we do
everything else right [but] through a
single mistake allow a customer to
undertake illegal transactions …
through our branch, we will not only
risk our lives but also our reputation
could be irreparably damaged.
(Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 13) see
box 1 for a step-by-step of MTOs
remittance process.

Box 1:
1.
MTOs receive the money from the sender (a
member of the diaspora), their contact info and a
valid ID, cash they want to remit, receive
commission, and gets details about the recipient.
2.
The agent screens the names of the sender
and the recipient through the Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List, the US Treasury Department
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) roster of
individuals and entities subject to
counterterrorism and other sanctions; if the check
returns no results, the transaction can proceed.
3.
The agent submits the transaction by
updating the amount, the sender’s and the
recipient’s details, and instructions as to where to
deliver the funds to a clearinghouse, usually at the
MTO headquarters. Submission is generally done
electronically.
4.
The clearinghouse reviews and confirms that
proper due diligence has been followed and, if
satisfied, approves the transaction. The details
immediately appear on an online database so that
the sending agent, the headquarters, and the
paying agent can all see the transaction. If the
clearinghouse is not satisfied, it suspends the
transaction and asks the sending agent to provide
additional information.
5.
The receiving agent then deposits the cash in
a local bank account to be transferred to the
company bank account.
6.
The paying agent views the transaction
information and notifies the recipient either by
telephone or by text message.
7.
The recipient goes to the nearest branch,
provides his or her details, proof of identity, and
the name and the location of the sender.
8.
The paying agent confirms the details given
against the transaction records in the database. If
the details match and the receiver’s identity is
confirmed, the agent generates a receipt from the
system. Once the recipient signs the receipt, the
agent pays the money and the system
automatically informs the sender (usually by text
message) that the money has been paid to the
recipient. The transaction is completed. (Orozco
and Yansura, 2013, p. 12)
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Somali-American MTO account closures have undermined the US-based Somali diaspora’s
confidence in the US government and financial sector and have endangered the lives and
livelihoods of Somalis. To avoid the adverse consequences of further account closings, the
Somali authorities, the US government, banks, and MTOs need to find a solution to allow
remittances from the US to Somalia to continue (Orozco and Yansura, 2013).
a. The Problem
Somali-American MTOs require US bank accounts to operate. They have invested in
compliance systems and training to adhere to US anti-money laundering regulations.
Nevertheless, US banks claim that Somalia is a high-risk destination for remittances and
have closed MTOs’ bank accounts without providing specific justifications at twice the rate
of closures of Latin American MTO accounts. Account closures began to affect SomaliAmerican MTOs as early as 1990 and spiked in 2001 onwards. These closures have
disrupted an economic lifeline to Somalia, hindered business growth, encouraged
informality among remittance senders, and strained relations between the SomaliAmerican community and US officials (Orozco and Yansura, 2013). MTO bank account
closures had been a common practice in the US, UK and Australia in a precautionary
measure to respond to the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combatting the Financing of
Terrorism (CFT) regulations. From a financial inclusion standpoint, many believe this is a
step in a very devastating direction.
At the beginning when OUS started to get involved in the remittance issues, there
was a feeling that some banks are discriminating against Somalia, and that is why there
were suggestions of campaigning against those banks. But as the Keeping the Lifeline Open
report was released, the campaign team understood that it is not discrimination on the part
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of banks, but rather it is a US government problem that unfolds clearly into two reasons
articulated by Senior Humanitarian Advisor in: a) “A broad trend in the banking sector
called de-risking due to certain drivers such as the financial crisis and consolidation of
banks.” b) “High penalties on banks that violate US money-laundering regulations
compared to the low revenue banks generate from.” (OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor,
Personal Communication, January 2015). So it is
both reputational and legal risk.
OUS commissioned research to gain a
comprehensive picture of the remittance issue and
possible solutions culminating in the research
report “Keeping the Lifeline Open” in June 2013,
which was co-branded with Adeso and InterAmerican Dialogue (which conducted the

Recommendations from the Report
(box 2):
1. [US] Banks should expand services
to Somali-American MTOs.
2. US policymakers should prioritize
remittance to Somalia.
3. The us treasury department should help
integrate Somali-American MTOs into an
automated clearinghouse (ACH)
4. MTOs should improve training
and monitoring of agents
5. MTOs and regulators should
collaborate on best practices
6. MTOs should develop mobile money
transfer technology for Somalia
7. The us government should help
Somalia regulate its payment systems
8. Somali authorities should actively
regulate international money transfers

research). The report gives a clear overview of
Somalia remittances and outlines clear recommendations to banks, US policy makers,
MTOs, US government officials, and Somali authorities to ensure the continued flow of
remittances to Somalia while addressing genuine security concerns (See box 2).
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There was a bill introduced by
Congressman Ellison (Rep. D. MN) and OUS's
supported the passage of this bill. When
Ellison’s bill started moving in Congress,
Congressman Adam Smith (Rep. D. WA) got
interested and wanted to learn more about

Money Remittances Improvement Act of
2014 explained (box 3):
A bill that passed in the United States House of
Representatives during the 113th United States
Congress. The bill would "allow the Treasury
secretary to use state examinations for certain
financial institutions instead of federal
reporting requirements." The bill would make
it easier for nonbank financial institutions such
as money service businesses to provide
payments internationally.

the issue. OUS was able to work with Smith’s staff and convinced them to work with
Congressman Ellison’s bill and Congressman Smith became a co-sponsor of the bill which
helped push the bill through Congress and House on the summer and was signed into law
by President Obama on August of 2014 as the Money Remittances Improvement Act (see
box 3 for the bill highlights and appendices for the original bill).
The bill streamlines the remittances process by "allow[ing] the Treasury secretary
to use state examinations for certain financial institutions instead of federal reporting
requirements" (Marcos, 2014). The bill is also supposed to make it easier for nonbank
financial institutions such as Money Service Businesses (MSBs) to provide remittance
payments internationally. The bill reduces the regulatory burden on MSBs and US banks
dealing with them, which have come under a tight scrutiny of the US government.
Therefore, state examiners can focus on the most problematic cases or MTOs instead of
being spread thin, looking at the whole sector. As OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor puts it,
“By focusing on the real problems, the system becomes more secure, which, in theory,
makes it more bankable” (OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Personal Communication,
January 2015). Although OUS supported the passage of the bill, it regarded it as a modest
proposal with no guarantees that it would make a difference in strengthening access to
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banking services for Somali-American MTOs. OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor describes
the primary significance of the bill as “ a symbolic gesture by Congress in support of
banking for MTOs” (Personal Communication, January 2015).
For a period leading up to January 2015, Somali MTOs have been heavily reliant on a
single bank, Merchants Bank of California, to transfer between 60 to 80 percent of the total
remittances sent to Somalia from the U.S. (Welsh, 2015). Although OUS succeeded in
preventing Merchants from closing accounts in the summer of 2014, as originally
scheduled, due to pressure from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
Merchants Bank announced that it would terminate all of its Somali MTO accounts on
February 6, 2015. Consequently, many Somali MTOs, including the largest by volume and
coverage, were planning to discontinue money transfers if the account closures move
forward as planned. While it is difficult to assess how much money Somali-Americans will
be able to send following the account closures, between $200m-$400m/year could be at
stake (Orozco and Yansura, 2013). MTOs could manage to continue their business based
on, for example in the UK, a wholesale MTOs who have existing accounts that MTOs with no
accounts can transfer money through. This is a vulnerable process as banks can still
pressure those wholesale MTOs to end business with MTOs with no accounts. Other means
leave diaspora with illegal channels of transfer with no official oversight, usually costly and
put the sender’s (diaspora) money at risk of fraud.
b. Policy Change Goals
There were a number of policy alternatives and solutions discussed and pushed by
OUS in the campaign and campaign spikes. The proposed solutions included mending
current banking regulations. OUS was also discussing the possibility of the New York
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Federal Reserve Bank to open accounts for MTOs to maintain the flow of remittances. OUS
message to the Department of Treasury and US Department of State was to ensure that
Somali Americans are able to continue to support their families in Somalia.
US Department of State and US Department of Treasury have been also working
with the Somali Central Bank to strengthen its financial system to be able to integrate it in
the international financial network. This is one of the campaign’s long-term goals that, if
fulfilled, would reduce reliance on remittance and strengthen the remittance system.
OUS further decided to influence Merchants bank to reverse their decision to close
Somali-American MTO bank accounts. The purpose was to win time to continue its
campaign so that the government can take more serious actions to solve the issue of
remittances once and for all.
The Politics
Ingrained within the first Amendment to the US constitution, Freedom of Speech and
Expression is protected by law. Thus, NGOs such as Oxfam America have the power and
latitude to advocate and influence legislations and regulations of the US government. OUS
advocates and influence US government on a number of issues. On this issue, OUS has
identified at least three targets for its campaign and subsequent campaign spike. OUS
aimed to influence the Department of Treasury to ensure legal and secure channels for the
Somali diaspora to remit money to their families in Somalia. OUS also supported the
introduction and passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act in the House and
Senate as well as attempted to influence the private sector represented in Merchants Bank
to delay their decision to close MTO bank accounts. Since WIN attempts to build the
capacity of national influencing teams and many, like myself, are not U.S. politically savvy,
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the following section describes the institutions the campaign targeted to make easier to
understand the politics involved in the campaign.

This paragraph was removed for confidentiality consideration.
The US Treasury Department is the executive agency responsible for promoting
economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the United States (U.S.
Department of The Treasury, 2011). The mission of the Treasury Department is to:
Maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities by promoting the
conditions that enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad, strengthen
national security by combating threats and protecting the integrity of the financial system,
and manage the U.S. Government’s finances and resources effectively. (U.S. Department of
The Treasury, 2011)
US Banking regulations are fragmented. These regulations fall under the supervision
of at least three institutions within the Treasury: the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC). They are also subject to the State rules where these banks are located. The
main issue that US banks have with MTOs is that US banking regulations require banks to
comply with AML and CFT regulations. Huge fines are imposed on banks that violate these
laws. Since Somalia is viewed as a risky destination, banks avoid dealing with SomaliAmerican MTOs. It’s a simple cost-benefit analysis. Since working with remittances and
MTOs doesn't generate as much revenue as other transactions, and the penalties are
greater than the profits, banks choose to 'de-risk' or avoid dealing with Somali MTOs
altogether. The laws that the Department of Treasury states for transparency in the words

SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES

23

of David Cohen, Under Secretary of the Treasury of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,
are:
At its core, financial transparency requires financial institutions to implement
certain basic controls:
•

they must know who their customers are;

•

they must understand their customers’ normal and expected transactions;

•

and they must keep the records and make the reports necessary for
regulators and law enforcement to take action to hold accountable those who
abuse the financial system. (Cohen, 2014).

The State Department is the equivalent of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in many
countries. The Department's mission is to:
Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster
conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and
people everywhere. This mission is shared with the USAID, ensuring we have a
common path forward in partnership as we invest in the shared security and
prosperity that will ultimately better prepare us for the challenges of tomorrow.
(U.S. Department of State, 2014)

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the leading US
government agency that works to " end extreme global poverty and enable resilient,
democratic societies to realize their potential" (USAID, 2014). President John F. Kennedy
created USAID in 1961. Using less than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID works
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in over 100 countries on various areas such as economic prosperity, democracy and good
governance, human rights, global health, food security and agriculture, and education to
mention a few (USAID, 2014). What OUS aimed to achieve with the State Department and
USAID is that they work—to fulfill their mission—with the Somali government to bolster
their financial institutions, chiefly Somali Central Bank so as to be part of the global
financial network and be able to manage remittances from and outside of Somalia.
There are three branches of the United States federal government: Congress, the
legislative branch, the President, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court, or the
judicial branch. Congress is responsible for passing laws and is divided into two chambers:
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The number of representatives in the house
varies vis-à-vis the number of population in that state. If a state has a large population,
there will be more representatives in the house. However, only two senators are elected for
each state to represent the people in the Senate. Of the three main branches of the US
federal government, Congress is the only branch directly elected by the American people.
Members of the US House of Representatives are elected every two years by the people of
that State. Senators used to be appointed by state legislatures. Under public pressure, the
17th amendment to article that was added to the US constitution in 1913 that gave the
people the right to elect their Senators. Due to the dependence of both Representatives and
Senators on voters, they become largely accountable to them. Each representative
represents the people of a single constituency, or district.
There are at least 109, 000 Somalis in the United States (World Bank as cited in
Keeping the Lifeline open). The heaviest concentrations are found in the Twin Cities
(Minneapolis and Saint Paul) in Minnesota, followed by Washington, DC; Columbus, Ohio;
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New York City; Buffalo, New York; Kansas City; San Diego; San Francisco; Seattle metro
areas (Somali community in US: Demographics, n.d.). Since most of the diaspora are
American citizens and have the power of voting, Congressmen are accountable to their
needs and demands. It goes without saying that most of the Somali diaspora would be
considerably impacted should remittances be entirely discontinued and would find
themselves unable to support their families back home. Thus, Representative Keith Ellison
(D-MN) from district seven in Minneapolis, MN, where the majority of Somali diaspora
resides, introduced a bill to the Congress that would become the Money Remittances
Improvement Act of 2014. Soon, another Representative, Smith (D-WA), from Washington,
where another Somali majority resides, co-sponsored the bill and helped push it through
the Senate and the House.
The campaign work had no direct opponents to its tasks. Resistance to granting OUS’s
asks was obvious on the part of Department of Treasury to make urgent steps for more
time was needed to painstakingly analyze the risks associated with any of the policy
alternatives. This resistance stems from the Treasury’s concern of taking any solution that
may facilitate laundering money and financing of terrorism. US banks also resisted keeping
the accounts open for MTOs based off their fear of violating AML/CFT regulations.
Strategy
When OUS was requested to work on the remittances issue by Somali partner
organizations, OUS tasked its Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor, Scott Paul, with
exploring the possibilities to get involved in the issue. Scott Paul travelled to Minnesota in
May 2012 and Somaliland the following August to explore the root causes of the problem
and potential for Oxfam involvement. OUS then commissioned further research to gain a
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comprehensive picture of the remittance issue and possible solutions culminating in the
research report ‘Keeping the Lifeline Open’ in June 2013. The research report was cobranded with Adeso and Inter-American Dialogue, the organization that conducted the
research. The Inter-American Dialogue was chosen mainly as their senior fellow Manuel
Orozco, a well-respected researcher by US banks, the World Bank and on Capitol Hill, has
conducted extensive research, policy analysis and advocacy on issues relating to global
flows of remittances, and migration and development worldwide. OUS believed that having
a specialist conduct the research brings credibility to the content and findings. The
research aimed at providing evidence to how remittances are crucial for Somali life,
livelihood, and Somali economy and made clear recommendations for US government,
agencies, private banks, and MTOs.
The report release was accompanied by launch events in Washington, DC, Seattle,
Minneapolis, Nairobi and the UK. Approximately 60 people attended OUS’s report launch
event in the Rayburn House Office Building in DC. Scott Paul spoke with researcher Manuel
Orozco and Representative Keith Ellison (D-MN) on a panel moderated by OUS board
member and former NPR Correspondent Anne Garrels. The audience included foreign
affairs and financial services staff, USAID and State Department officials, and members of
the Intelligence Community; roughly half of the audience members appeared to be juniorlevel staff or interns (WIN Case Study, Somalia Remittances, 2014). The report was widely
distributed. According to the same WIN case study, OUS distributed 600 report copies and
Adeso few hundred and via email, including to key targets, including government officials,
State Department and USAID officers. (WIN Case Study, Somalia Remittances, 2014),
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The Remittance work had three main objectives. Each one was advanced through different
strategies and specific tactics.
i. Passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act.
OUS tactics include convening events, diaspora led events, round tables, and media
work. Senior Humanitarian Advisor wrote four remittance blogs on Oxfam’s blog page,
which had a combined 908 unique page views and 360 shares during this period. Oxfam
also hosted one event in Seattle and spoke at two events in Minneapolis that were attended
by members of the Somali Diaspora, congressional staffers, Somali imams and community
leaders.
When Representative Ellison (D-MN), who represents a district where the largest
Somali diaspora in the US reside, was introducing the bill in the Spring of 2014, OUS
worked in his district to mobilize the diaspora to create a positive incentive for him to
continue to lead on the issue. OUS further wrote a letter of support to Rep. Ellison
regarding the bill, (see picture and appendices.) Oxfam collaborated with the Somali Youth
and Family Club, directed by Hamdi Abdulle, a community organizer, to host the first event,
a round table, in Seattle. The round table was attended by diaspora members, money
service representatives and also engaged elected officials such as the mayor of Seattle who
sent one of his advisors, Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), representative of a district where the
majority of the Somali diaspora lives in Washington State, who also sent one of his staffers.
Senior Humanitarian Advisor presented the findings from the Keeping the Lifeline Open
report to the audience. This resulted in further communication with Rep Smith office and
when Ellison’s bill started moving in Congress, Rep. Smith was interested and wanted to
learn more about the issue. OUS was able to convince Rep. Smith’s staff to hold a round
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table of multiple stakeholders, including private banks and MTO representatives. Having
heard from attendants, especially banks, that they are closing Somali MTO accounts due to
pressures from the Office of the Comptroller of the Curre
Currency
ncy (OCC) and that it is a
government problem, Representative Smith’s staff agreed to work with Ellison’s office on
the bill, and Smith became a co
co-sponsor.
sponsor. This helped push the bill through Congress over
the summer. President Obama signed the bill into la
law in August 8, 2014.
The remittance report, Adeso and Oxfam were well
well-represented
represented in international
media outlets and the report led to solid news coverage the last quarter of 2013, earning 17
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media hits tallied by OUS." (Final Remittances Report
Report, Feb. 2014).
ii. Getting the Treasury Department to ensure that all Somali-Americans
Americans are able to send
money to their loved ones through formal and legal channels. OUS targeted the Treasury in
this campaign spike and used social media to be the primary vehicle for engaging people,
the diaspora in particular, and to take actions directed at the Treasury. According to the
recent report by Oxfam, Hanging by a Thread (2015), such pressure led the US government
to take some modest but important steps to keep remitta
remittances
nces flowing to Somalia.
iii. Pressing Merchants Bank to keep Somali MTO accounts open
open.. The spike involved a
petition and utilized social media to inform the public audience
audience.. It also involved diasporaled events, panel discussions and individual tactics such aas the film on US of Somali families
affected by remittances cut off. OUS has also engaged with senior officials within the MTOs
and industry associations representi
representing
ng them on how to strengthen their business practices
(compliance) and the industry as a whole through collective action. OUS has been in
discussions with approximately 25 MTO officials including one at the CEO level, two global
directors and 10 US executives.
ves. Bank representatives also attended the roundtable hosted
by Rep. Smith in Seattle, WA suggested by OUS.
Adeso has led outreach to the MTO Executives and contributed research conducted in
Somalia. It also created an infographic and disseminated information through its networks.
Separate from the spike, Adeso has also played a valuable role in liaising with MTO
executives in Dubai. Overall, OUS strategies have contributed to developing a strong
network with key decision makers that can be utilized in further campaign in and outside
of the remittances field. According to the Final Remittances Report, the average rating of
contacts made in the remittances campaign is comparable to the over
overall
all rating of all
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government affairs contacts during FY13 Q2. The following table was tallies by OUS in the
final report:
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Diaspora Engagement
The role of the diaspora was very crucial to obtaining traction and partial gains for
the campaign. Diaspora engaged in many events the campaign organized as well as selforganized some events. They called on elected leaders to enact policy, rallied and
demonstrated directly in front of the Treasury office in St. Paul, MN and were effective.
Diaspora was an important part of the campaign’s strategy and was committed to the issue,
as it affects them and their families in such a direct and personal manner.
The campaign identified members of the Somali diaspora who are highly respected
and have expertise in organizing. Although it took some time to find the right individuals,
the campaign made use of existing organizations such as the Service Employee
International Union (SEIU), which regularly organizes workers such as janitors and taxi
drivers in campaigns, connected Oxfam with Somalis in Minneapolis. Additionally, the
campaign work with Congressman Keith Ellison, who is one of two Muslim Congressmen,
helped access wider Somali community in mosques such as Imams and influential
community leaders.

Theory of Change for Somalia Remittances Campaign

EMITTANCES
Overall Goal
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Ensure formal channels for Somalis to
remit money from the US into Somalia

Sustain Somali
Families through
remittances

Strengthen the Somali
economy

Treasury change
regulations

Remittances transferred
effectively/efficiently

Fed. Reserve

Government &
l Bank

Congress passes MRI act
to use state policies, didn’t
solve the problem

Advocates in
focus
rategies

Merchants bank does not
drop MTOs

Banks change
policies/practices
regarding Somali MTOs

Lobbying

Research
evidence/
Credibility

Mobilize
Oxfam’s
supporters
and Somali
diaspora
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Monitoring and Evaluation
There were not any Monitoring and Evaluation plan in place during the
campaign. In fact, as the campaign is still in process, there has not been any internal
or external evaluation conducted to measure its success and impact. There are,
however, two internal case studies: one 3-page case study conducted in March 2014
and another 7-page case study completed in early February 2015. Both cases
highlight OUS’s contributions to some of the changes in policy regarding
remittances. They also highlight OUS’s development in terms of campaigning on
remittances and gaining contacts and connections with the US government, Somali
diaspora, Somali MTOs and US banks.
Communication
Oxfam has a set of principles, known as National Influencing Guidelines, to
guide its influencing efforts in the countries in which they operate. These are
principles regarding partnerships, namely working with civil society and social
movements, working with governments, working with the private sector, gender
guidelines on southern influencing, among others. For the purpose of this paper, only
principles on working with governments will be assessed in the following table,
since the campaign main target was a governmental institution, U.S. Department of
Treasury.
Oxfam realizes that governments vary considerably in their approach to
executing their responsibilities towards their citizens. Hence, Oxfam employ, as per
the relevant theory of change, various approaches to ensure support of people’s
rights. The following table assesses the practices in the campaign against the
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relevant principles; whether campaign practices complied with or deviated from
those principles in the US context.
Guideline Principles

Assessment

Oxfam does not get involved in the party politics

The campaign was non-partisan and worked with

of government. But Oxfam cares deeply about

different major player to ensure the passage of the

how those who are in power relate to people

MRI act. Complying with this principle has helped to

who are vulnerable and marginalised, our

the MRI act passage in a congress that is very

constituency.

divided, with no opposition.

Oxfam is particularly interested in working with

This principle was at the core of the campaign. OUS’s

government in situations where policy or legal

involvement was in response to requests by Somali

change and/or improved implementation would

local organizations. The report OUS commissioned

benefit large numbers of people living in

showed that at least 40% of the Somali economy will

poverty.

be impacted in case of remittances disruption. OUS’s
mission is to fight poverty, hunger and injustice. This
principle has been completely complied with.

Oxfam’s multiple methods of engaging and/or

This principle is typical of campaigns. It’s been

working directly with government are adjusted

followed by the campaign team when identifying

according to local circumstances. Decisions

most influential decision makers and best practices

about how to best work with each government

to influence them.

are made on a case-by-case basis, considering
local factors.
Oxfam may provide support to partners working

N/A

with government, or, in some cases, even directly
to Government units themselves.
While fully supporting government to discharge

OUS complied with this principle since no

its rights responsibilities, Oxfam also seeks to

government influence on their work was identified.

maintain a degree of separation from
government in order to preserve the
independence of our work.
Oxfam may play convening roles to assist

OUS fully complied with this principle as some of the

government to work more effectively with other

influencing tactics included convening government

parties, such as academia, civil society, people’s

officials (Treasury, Congress and USAID) with private

organisations, unions, faith-based organisations,

sector and civil society. One example is the

and the private sector.

roundtable that OUS organized in Seattle with
Congressman Smith’s staff, bank and MTO

SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES

35
representatives.

Oxfam may have a linking function to help

OUS influencing included urging Treasury and State

national governments engage more productively

Department to support the Somali Central bank. This

with regional and international bodies.

principle has been followed in the campaign by
linking US Government with the Somali Government.

When Oxfam works on national advocacy efforts

If we apply this principle on OUS relationship with

directed at government, Oxfam seeks to

it’s sole ally, we would find a deviation from the

strengthen our national-level partners and to

principle. Adeso didn’t gain prominence or publicity

give them more prominence.

as OUS reputation and organization of events
prevailed. According to an internal case study Adeso
was “barely mentioned at the Hill launch event
because it did not directly support the event, even
though it was noted as a sponsor of the paper… The
effect of this decision was to further minimize the
Adeso partnership and Adeso’s role.”

Oxfam applies the same high levels of financial

N/A

accountability for our government partners that
it maintains for our civil society or academic
partners.

Assessment of Campaign Communication
According to the Humanitarian Communication Officer, OUS Communication
Department tried to show how remittances affect the daily life of Somalis in such a
concrete way that US citizens could understand. In order to capture the extent to
which OUS communication was effective, it will be gauged against a framework
developed by the Center for Story-based Strategy (2013), known as F.R.A.M.E.S.
Framing the Issue
OUS and Adeso conveyed the issue of remittance disruption to Somalia from
a humanitarian lens. OUS mission is to fight poverty, hunger, and injustice around
the world. Similarly, Adeso’s mission is to create the atmosphere for Africans to
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thrive. Hence, the frame focused on capturing the humanitarian impacts that
disruption of remittance would cause. This is clear from their communication tactics
such as the video, research, blog posts, among others. The general message was:
Remittances cut-off is a cut of Somalis lifeline.
Reframe Opponent’s Story & Reinforce Our Frame
The campaign did a great effort to reframe the image of Somalia from a risky
destination for the flow of remittances to a country recovering form being a failed
state. This is conspicuous in providing evidence that remittance money is spent on
basic needs and services such as food health and education. Additionally, the
campaign emphasized the humanitarian aspect and the importance of remittances
to the 40% of Somalis and the fact that remittances constitute one third of the
Somali economy. Therefore, the issue was reframed from preventing terrorism and
money laundering to preventing people from going hungry. Perhaps, one aspect that
could be stressed further is the financial inclusion prospective. This aspect could
have engaged more stakeholders and, more importantly, garnered more supporters.
Accessible to the Audience
The Somalia remittances campaign was indeed one of the most accessible to
the main audience. It was not hard, according to interviewees, to engage the
diaspora in an issue that directly affects them. Diaspora (see section on strategy)
organized some events and attended most of the events organized by the campaign.
An area of improvement might be encouraging all diaspora to invite some of their
fellow Americans to take part in events and actions directed at campaign targets.
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This will make the campaign supporters expand beyond diaspora and Somali
workers.
Meme
A meme means that messaging and communications should be something
accessible, relatable, and memorable for the main audience. Creating an image in the
minds of audience is a powerful tool to get their support. The campaign has a superb
meme: Keep the Lifeline Open for Somalia. It conjures up an imagery that remittances
is a lifeline; rather the heartbeat of Somalia and, should it be cut, Somalis will be
lifeless, dependent, and poverty-stricken.
Emotions
The campaign communication was not only intellectual and commonsensical,
but above all emotional. It appealed to the emotions and values of the audience and
helped trigger an emotional response that led to taking actions. Anyone would feel
upset at US regulations when watching the video or reading the infographic, both
showing the suffering that Somalis would go through if remittances are disrupted.
Simple and Short
Regardless of the complications of US AML/CFT regulations, the fact is that
people’s life is at the bottom of the story. The campaign paid a considerable focus to
this human story and amplified it, and made as simple as possible. At least 40% (4
million) Somalis would be hugely affected by the remittance disruption. The
campaign team utilized the powerful story and made it a moral and legal
responsibility on the part of the US administration, Treasury and Congress to ensure
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formal channels for the flow of remittances to Somalia from its diaspora in the
States.
Effectiveness, Outcomes and Contribution
In policy advocacy, attribution of contribution becomes a difficult task. A fair
evaluation of the campaign, however, would feature remarkable contributions from
OUS involvement in the campaign to the campaign outcomes. OUS took on a
courageous decision to get involved in a campaign they had no time to prepare for.
The humanitarian team then solicited support from other teams, such as
Government Affairs, Private Sector, Organizing and Alliances, Media, and Research
teams. It is also important to note that OUS has no prior experience in remittances
when they worked on this campaign. By taking on the remittances issue, OUS
became the only US INGO to work on remittances.
Oxfam had three periods of intense campaigning, or ‘campaign spikes,’ a)
support passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act and b) Pressure US
Department of State and Department of Treasury to change bank regulations and
work with the Somali Central Bank to strengthen the bank’s financial system, and c)
convince Merchants Bank to reverse its decision to close Somali MTO accounts. One
campaign spike, from December 2011 to April 2014, culminated in the signing of
Money Remittances Improvement Act into law by President Obama in April 2014.
The second campaign succeeded in pressuring the Department of State and
Department of Treasury to take some steps towards ensuring the flow of
remittances into Somalia. The third spike, in May 2014, focused on Merchant’s Bank
and was ultimately unsuccessful.
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According to a recent Oxfam publication, Hanging by a Thread (2015), OUS
influencing work directed at the US government further have helped pressure
government actions towards improving remittances into Somalia over the past
three years. These actions include important steps to strengthen Somalia’s financial
system. This is reflected in the formation of a National Security Council-led
interagency working group on remittances to Somalia, which demonstrates that the
government has come to appreciate the consequences of a disruption in remittance
flows. The U.S. Department of Treasury and USAID have worked together with the
Central Bank of Somalia to help improve its public financial management system,
setting the ground for the Central Bank of Somalia to become financially selfsufficient. In order to be able to connect with the international financial network,
the Treasury Department is helping the Central Bank of Somalia to build its
supervision unit. However, the most promising step of all was the Treasury's
commitment in September 2014 to set clear expectations for banks dealing with
high-risk MTOs. This commitment is seen, according to OUS recent research, as a
promise that reflects real political commitment "to addressing the systemic
challenges facing the most difficult-to serve money transfer corridors" (Hanging by
a Thread, 2015).
OUS’s third campaign spike targeted at Merchants Bank decision to close
Somali MTO accounts was successful in temporarily reprieving Merchants decision
for six months. The campaign spike involved a petition, a day of international twitter
action, a couple of diaspora-led events including a rally and another public panel as
well as media and lobbying work. Individual tactics were very effective, such as a
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video featuring Somali-Americans that highlighted how Somali families would be
affected if remittances are disrupted. Despite these efforts, Merchants Bank went
ahead with the account closures on February 6, 2015. In multi-stakeholder
campaigns such setbacks are normal. On the positive side of this spike, OUS gained
specific strategies on influencing financial institutions and won a six-month period
of time in which they kept working on influencing other targets.
OUS’s work on remittances also built OUS’s own capacity to do effective
policy work in this area. It strengthened Oxfam’s relationships with the US Somali
diaspora community and raised Oxfam America’s profile on remittances in the US,
being the only international NGO conducting remittance advocacy in the US. It
demonstrated Oxfam’s ability to play a convening role between governments, the
diaspora, and the private sector on this issue.
Lessons Learned
There is so much that can be learned from the campaign and from writing a
case study on it. Writing this case study has been a very rewarding learning
experience. I have conducted 8 interviews with a number of stakeholders including
OUS staff, a member of each of OUS in-country staff, Adeso, Rep. Smith’s staff, Global
Center on Cooperative Security, and Somali diaspora. Some of the interviews were
followed up with few questions to be clarified via emails. I audio-taped all
interviews and transcribed some of them. I was also taking quick notes of the most
important points discussed. I gained more confidence with every interview I did. I
noticed an improvement in my interviewing skills in terms of type and clarity of
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questions asked; follow up questions, notes taking, and following up with
interviewees.
This case study is special. It is the only case where two policy experts were
revising it, Gabrielle Watson and Jeff Unsicker. It seemed that I was under a
showering of questions every time the draft was sent to them for review. It turned
out that those questions were helping me understand more about the campaign. It
was not by any means meant to make it difficult for me. In fact, that helped me not
only feel accomplished about my efforts on this case, but also helped me develop a
critical lens when writing the longer case study. I always asked myself similar
questions that were posed to me for the shorter case, which helped me further
analyze and better understand the campaign.
Lessons learned from the campaign are many. In terms of policy advocacy,
this case is rich with lessons. But to me, a few lessons stand out. I learned that
putting a human face or story on the campaign is very crucial to gain media
coverage and influence targets. OUS was able to garner national and international
media and engage digital audience via social media by virtue of the human side of
the campaign. I think Merchants bank was also influenced to a certain extent by the
story, especially the video and research results. That is why they postponed their
decision to close Somali MTO bank accounts for six months. In addition, showing
evidence based research results along with the human story is a powerful tool to
influence government, State Department, and USAID in particular. The results
clearly indicate that the crux of the issue lies within the US banking regulations and
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portrays a sense of urgency to take actions to help remittances flow smoothly
without any disruption.
In the wake of the February 6th account closures by Merchants Bank, it
becomes apparent that getting the Money Remittances Improvement Act, while a
positive step, was not sufficient to keep remittance flows open. The Act did not stop
the private bank decision to close MTO bank accounts. It also has not facilitated the
ability and capacity of nonbank financial institutions, such as money service
business, to remit money internationally. So, an act passed by the Government does
not necessarily mean solving the problem.
It is possible to develop the space to work on an issue at the request of
partner organizations and find internal support for it, even if a specific issue is not
an OUS priority, is initially perceived as risky. The humanitarian team was able to
successfully solicit support and staff time from the Government Affairs, Private
Sector, Organizing and Alliances, Media, and Research teams, even though
remittances are not an agency priority.
The portrayal of partner organizations is crucial at external events. Adeso
was barely mentioned at the Capitol Hill launch event because it did not directly
support the event, even though it was noted as a sponsor of the paper. OUS also
decided not to read the Somali Prime Minister and researcher’s written statements
because of a general sense that it would not be appropriate to read written
statements aloud. The effect of this decision was to further minimize the Adeso
partnership and Adeso’s role. Better communication about Adeso’s role in the event
during the planning process would have fostered a better relationship. In order for
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OUS practice to match its rhetoric and desire to form Southern-based NGO partners,
communication and collaboration with Southern-based NGOs needs to encompass
all phases of the project and the nature of the relationship needs to be
communicated clearly to other stakeholders in the organization.
It is necessary to thoroughly explain a partnership and previous work that
originated in collaboration with one affiliate to other affiliates as the partnership
expands. The Adeso-OUS partnership was originally confined to a single affiliate,
which then expanded to include OGB. The links with the country team were limited
mainly because of a change of staff over a key period of drafting the report. This
meant the Oxfam in Somalia team did not give adequate input into either the report
or the relationship with Adeso, which would have helped to strengthen the
partnership at the outset.
In an attempt to improve work with diaspora, OUS Senior Humanitarian
Advisor recommends conducting a thorough research of diaspora and talk to lots of
people to ensure they have the necessary networks and skills to be more effective
partners. OUS Humanitarian Advisor stressed the importance of listening to what
the diaspora care about in order to build a long-term trust and relationship.
One good practice that the campaign team learned that came out of the early
outreach meeting in the summer of 2013 is to share reports with stakeholders to get
their input before the final publication. Scott Paul sent copies of the draft report to
some participants before an event in Seattle and sought feedback. The feedback was
helpful as Scott was updating the report. For the new report that will be launched in
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mid February 2015, Scott sent a draft of the report to be shared with communities in
Seattle, Minneapolis, and Columbus.
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Appendix A
Cargill,
ill, Land and Power in Colombia, A WIN Case Study.

WIN CASE STUDY
Cargill,, Land and Power in Colombia
Summary
As part of the GROW campaign, Oxfam in Colombia along with Oxfam Great Britain (OGB),
Oxfam Intermón (OES), Oxfam America (OUS) and allied national organizations in Colombia
worked together to stop a bill the Colombian government was pr
preparing
eparing to present to Congress.
The bill was designed to facilitate and legalize large
large-scale
scale concentration of land intended for
small farmers. Oxfam contributed to an informed debate in Colombia on rural development,
equitable access to land, and protection of the rights of small farmers and supported small
sma
farmers’ organizations by publishing a rigorous study that backed their proposals and demands.
demands
and thus strengthened their ability to get their voices heard. Oxfam had three major outcomes:
1) the high public profile of a research report, Divide and Pur
Purchase,, prepared by Oxfam in
Colombia; 2) the wide dissemination and coverage of the case by the media;; and 3) the
government’s commitment to not only withdraw the bill but also to not submit it again.

Divide and Purchase Report Event, Colombia
Photo by Oxfam in Colombia

SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES
Introduction
One of the central themes of the Oxfam GROW Campaign is access to land, ways of acquiring it,
and practices involving land concentration and monopolization. Land is a topic of interest for
GROW in Colombia, as the increasing concentration of this resource constitutes a threat to
small-scale agriculture and food production, and also reproduces and perpetuates the high
levels of poverty and inequality prevalent in the country. Concentration of land ownership is
also recognized as one of the main causes of the armed conflict in the country, and is thus one
of the central issues of the current peace talks taking place between the Colombian government
and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group.
As part of the GROW campaign, Oxfam in Colombia along with Oxfam Great Britain (OGB),
Oxfam Intermón (OES), Oxfam America (OUS) and allied national organizations in Colombia
worked together to stop a bill the Colombian government was preparing to present to Congress.
The bill was designed to facilitate and legalize large-scale concentration of land intended for
small farmers. Oxfam contributed to an informed debate in Colombia on rural development,
equitable access to land, and protection of the rights of small farmers and supported small
farmers’ organizations by publishing a rigorous study that backed their proposals and demands.
and thus strengthened their ability to get their voices heard. Oxfam had three major outcomes:
1) the high public profile of a research report, Divide and Purchase, prepared by Oxfam in
Colombia; 2) the wide dissemination and coverage of the case by the media; and 3) the
government’s commitment to not only withdraw the bill but also to not submit it again.
What was the goal?
Given the interests of the GROW Campaign, the political situation in Colombia, and the
evolution of the research, four goals were defined for the campaign spike:
1. To contribute to an informed debate in Colombia on rural development, equitable
access to land, and protection of the rights of small farmers.
2. To draw the attention of the government (the legislative and executive branches,
Congress, and control bodies) to the need to establish effective regulations on largescale purchases of land.
3. To exercise pressure to prevent reforms that legalize practices such as those of Cargill.
4. To support small farmers’ organizations by publishing rigorous studies that back their
proposals and demands, and thus strengthen their ability to get their voices heard.
What was the result?
There are three results that stand out in this case. The first is the success of a global research
report, Divide and Purchase, by Oxfam in Colombia. The report was on a Colombian economic
justice issue that has regional and global implications - the undue concentration and
accumulation of land, a theme prioritized in the global GROW campaign. The report was used as
part of the global campaign, which was a first for Oxfam in Colombia. The second result is the
broad dissemination and coverage of the report in the media, which is a result of its quality,
relevance to the current Colombian situation, and the highly effective work carried out with the
media and social networks. The success of the report’s launch reflects recognition of Oxfam and
its convening power in Colombia, as well as the organization’s ability to analyze and make best
use of the current Colombian situation. Oxfam in Colombia worked with key allies throughout,
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including discussion of initial research findings and involvement in the report launch. The results
of the launch also demonstrate Oxfam’s skill in positioning itself, building its profile and creating
openings for civil society with a good research report. It further created a forum for discussion
in which the opinions of all parties could be voiced (state regulatory agencies, Congress, private
sector, and small farmers' organizations). The last result is that the government not only
withdrew the bill, but also did not submit it again.

How was change achieved?
As part of the GROW campaign, OUS included the identification of and research on possible land
grabbing cases involving US investors. In 2012, OUS contacted and financed Oxfam in Colombia
to conduct an exploratory study. The work to develop, publish and launch the report was carried
out jointly by OUS and Oxfam in Colombia, and the launch activities in 2013 and follow up in
Colombia were done by Oxfam in Colombia with support from OGB in LAC (Latin America and
the Caribbean).
After completing the initial research, there were requests from allies in Colombia to quickly
reveal the findings of the study. Colombian member of Congress Wilson Arias made a formal
request to Oxfam to present its findings. After consultation and agreement with allied national
organizations, Oxfam decided to present the initial results in a closed meeting in June 2013 with
media, opinion makers, members of Congress and allies. The preliminary results were published
in the media, including in Time Magazine. This caused a multiplier effect in the Colombian
national media, which fueled a scandal that had already erupted involving Colombia’s
Ambassador to the US, whose law firm had brokered the irregular land acquisitions by Cargill
and other companies. OUS and Oxfam in Colombia decided to publish an Oxfam report using the
research results, and OUS contacted Cargill about it, resulting in several meetings in which it was
agreed to submit the report to the company for review and respond well in advance of
publication. After receiving the report, Cargill initiated further dialogues with Oxfam: with OUS
and OGB at the highest level (Executive Directors); in Bogotá with the country team; and in
several other conversations with OUS. In most of these meetings, Cargill asked Oxfam, either
directly or indirectly, to not publish the report. The report was launched in September 2013 in
Colombia at an event with members of the media, government entities and NGOs.
The report launch drew further attention to the scandal in Colombia on the irregular acquisition
and accumulation of land (baldíos) in the Altillanura region by Cargill and others, giving an
important boost to work by Oxfam and allies in Colombia to halt the Ministry of Agriculture’s
initiative seeking to legalize such practices. The baldíos are lands which, under the Constitution,
should be given to landless small farmers, yet the reforms to the law would enable companies to
accumulate them, leading to further concentration of land holdings. Oxfam’s report and work
with allies brought greater attention to the issue and raised opposition to the idea of such
reforms.
Oxfam in Colombia brought together a broad group of allies to jointly hold a press conference in
November 2013, which was widely covered by the media (17 national and 24 international
media hits) and trended on social media as the most popular issue tweeted in Colombia the
morning of the launch. A few days later the Ministry submitted a bill to Congress, but the
Cabinet head ordered it withdrawn so as to revise and resubmit it. Following the launch, Oxfam
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convened a broad group of stakeholders, including some non-traditional allies, to speak out
jointly against the new law that was about to be introduced. Members of Congress also spoke
out and presented their own evidence against the law. Oxfam’s convening power and elevation
of the issue’s profile enabled allies to have more impact and pushed government oversight
entities to pay more attention to the problem of undue concentration of landholdings through
acquisition of baldíos. This way, Oxfam and allies kept up the pressure in Colombia against the
proposed reforms.
The issue was raised at the negotiating table between the government and the FARC. The high
profile of the issue brought it to the attention of the intermediator in the peace negotiations
between the Colombian government and the FARC. Oxfam’s report had already pointed out that
Cargill’s actions and any legislation that would make these actions legal would be incoherent
with agreements reached at the negotiating table. Intervention by the intermediator pushed the
government to commit to not reintroduce the bill to reform the sale and acquisition of baldíos.
In addition, a ruling by the Superintendencia de Sociedades (corporations superintendency)
ordered the multinational Monica Semillas to return money from state subsidies awarded to
shell companies that were set up by the multinational in order to break up land purchases. The
ruling sets a precedent which will discourage private enterprises from using corporate
mechanisms to circumvent the law.
What were the key lessons learned?
Good research on a topic that is nationally relevant and well-timed can raise an issue’s profile in
country, galvanize and support allies and have an impact on policy outcomes. Keys to success
are robust research and the country team’s willingness to use its convening power with allies
and other stakeholders to follow through with advocacy. Sometimes it can be helpful for Oxfam
to take a highly visible, public stance and put its own research and positions forward in support
of allies and a policy agenda shared with allies.
It is important to assess the external context in country and not just the interest to Oxfam with
regard to the initiative and to ensure joint ownership between country team and affiliate or
global team from the outset. The timeline should be set by the country team and flexibility to
accommodate opportunities should be allowed. The case was identified knowing the context in
Colombia and understanding that research findings could reveal information relevant to the
situation in the country as it was evolving. The concept was discussed jointly by OUS and the
Oxfam GROW team in Colombia as well as the Country Leadership Team, and the research was
of mutual interest to all involved. OUS and Oxfam in Colombia agreed to joint ownership of the
research and the process.
It is important to know and follow all affiliate, regional and private sector procedures for review,
sign-off risk and assessment from the beginning, and ensure close and regular communication in
the small core team, so that if questions or concerns arise from affiliate management at any
level, they can be easily addressed. The overall support by the three affiliates for publishing the
report despite requests and pressure from Cargill was important for the country team.
It is important to assess synergies between national and international media coverage, which
might be different for different countries. In this case, coverage by one international outlet
spurred more extensive national coverage, which in turn spurred more international media
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interest. Some national media outlets initially indicated the issue was too sensitive for them to
cover, but once there was international coverage, national media outlets were able carry the
story.

Finally, it is important to consider the potential for regional relevance of national influencing
work, since reports can also be useful for the influencing agendas in other countries of the
region even when there is no regional advocacy target for the issue. Country influencing
opportunities can spur regional interest and might generate unintended effects in other
countries, so it is worth including some regional planning around national launches. At
minimum, other countries in the region should be informed from the preparatory stage of the
research and at the launch.
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Somali Remittances Campaign, WIN Case Study.

WIN CASE STUDY
Somalia Remittances: Keeping the Lifeline Open
Summary
In December 2011, Oxfam America (OUS) began working on the issue of remittances to Somalia
at the request of Somali partner organizations that were alarmed by the closing of Money
Transfer Operator (MTO) accounts by US banks. Oxfam’s main partner for this work was African
Development Solutions (Adeso), a humanitarian and development NGO with a long history of
working in Somalia. This work succeed
succeeded in supporting the passage of the Money Remittance
Improvement Act in April 2014. The subsequent campaign spike succeeded in delaying
Merchants Bank decision to close Somali MTO bank accounts for six months, which on February
6th of this year decided to close the Somali MTO accounts. On a process outcome standpoint,
OUS’s work on the issue is significant because it was originally taken up at the request of the
Somali partner organizations and allowed Oxfam to strengthen relationships with the US Somali
diaspora and raising OUS’s profile on remittances in the US
US,, especially because OUS is the only
international NGO conducting remittance advocacy in the US. It also demonstrated the capacity
of OUS to play a convening role between governments, the diaspora, aand
nd the private sector on
this issue.

A woman buys household goods in Badhan, Somalia. Daniel Gerstle/ ©Adeso
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Introduction
Remittances to Somalia amount to approximately $1.3 billion a year, 16
16% of which comes from
the United States, an amount comparable to US humanitarian assistance to Somalia ($242
million)
illion) in 2012. Remittances are a lifeline for many Somalis, providing them with a means to
meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, clothing, and other basic necessities as well as
open and sustain small businesses, send children to school, and invest in their communities.
Over 40% of Somalis depend on money sent by relatives abroad and, due to this imminent
remittance disruption, over 56 thous
thousand Somali-Americans
Americans and Somali migrant workers would
be unable to support their families back home. Furthermore, this remittance cut
cut-off
off is likely to
destabilize communities, empower criminal groups, and deprive families of the support they
need to survive and thrive.
Somali-American
American Money Transfer Operator
Operators (MTOs) actively seek to comply with US regulations
and have made significant strides toward reducing risk through monitoring, record keeping, and
agent training. Still, the Somalia remittance pipeline is under serious threat. Despite their
efforts, Somali-American
American MTOs are often perceived as representing a high risk for illegal
activities, such as the financing of groups and individuals listed by the US government as
terrorists. Many banks closed MTO aaccounts, which made it difficult for MTOs to maintain
operations, disrupted remittances from the US to Somalia, and, in particular, jeopardized
jeopardiz the
survival of Somali families during the 2011 famine. This sent an alarm to Somali partner
organizations as further
rther bank account closures could result in a total remittance cutoff, which
would endanger more Somali lives and interrupt economic development in the country as a
whole. Partner organizations requested OUS to use it advocacy capacity to influence decision
decisio
makers in the US. OUS believes that iif all the stakeholders—the
the Somali authorities, the US
government, US banks, and Somali
Somali-American MTOs—make
make a concerted effort, they can prevent
these disruptions and greatly enhance the security of the remittance syste
system.
What was the goal?
For this campaign and Merchants campaign spike, OUS had the following goals:

1. Push the US Government to prioritize remittances to Somalia and commit to
preventing a significant disruption in the flow of money to Somalia through
emergency measures.
2. Through direct communication and media work, convince Merchants Bank to
reverse its decision to close Somali MTO accounts.
What was the result?
One campaign spike culminated in the signing of Money Remittances Improvement Act into law
by President Obama in April 2014. When Representative Ellison (D
(D-MN) was introducing the bill,
OUS worked in his district to mobilize the diaspora to create a positive incentive for him to
continue to lead on the issue. When Ellison’s bill started moving in congress, Representative
Smith (D-WA) got interested and wanted to learn more on the issue. OUS worked with his office
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to hold a round table of multiple stakeholders including private banks and MTO representatives.
Representative Smith’s staff agreed to work with Ellison on the bill and Smith became a cosponsor of the bill, which helped push the bill through Congress on the summer and became law
on April of 2014.
The bill would "allow the Treasury secretary to use state examinations for certain financial
institutions instead of federal reporting requirements." This means a streamline in the
remittances process; making it easy for the diaspora to send money to loved ones in Somalia.
The bill would also make it easier for nonbank financial institutions such as money service
businesses to provide remittance payments internationally. In the words of Representative
Ellison (D-MN) the “Passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act is cause for
celebration for all diaspora communities, including the Somali and Hmong communities I am
proud to represent in Minnesota.”
OUS influencing work directed at the US government further helped pressure government
actions towards improving remittances into Somali. The recent Oxfam publication, Hanging by a
Thread, mentions that the US government has taken some modest but important steps to help
put Somalia on a stronger financial footing. This is reflected in the formation of a National
Security Council-led interagency working group on remittances to Somalia, which demonstrates
that the government has come to appreciate the consequences of a disruption in remittance
flows. The Treasury and USAID have collaborated with the Central Bank of Somalia to help
improve its public financial management system, paving the way to become financially selfsufficient. The Treasury is helping the Central Bank build its supervision unit, a much-needed
capacity for any country that aims to connect to international financial networks. But most
promising is the Treasury September 2014 promise to clarify expectations for banks dealing with
high-risk MTOs; a promise which reflects real political commitment to addressing the systemic
challenges facing the most difficult-to serve money transfer corridors.
Oxfam’s work succeeded in strengthening relationships with the US Somali diaspora and raising
Oxfam America’s profile on remittances in the US. It also highlighted the potential for OUS to
play a convening role between governments, the diaspora, and the private sector on this issue.
OUS’s work on the issue is significant because it was originally taken up at the request of Somali
partner organizations and allowed Oxfam to develop solid relations with the Somali government
and diaspora. Although other NGOs are working on remittances within Somalia, Oxfam is the
only international NGO conducting remittance advocacy in the US.
OUS’s subsequent campaign spike targeted at Merchants Bank decision to close Somali MTO
accounts was successful in temporarily reprieving Merchants decision for six months. The
campaign spike involved a petition, a day of international twitter action, a couple of diaspora led
events including a rally and another public panel as well as media and lobbying work. Individual
tactics came off very well such as the film that was prepared mainly in the US of Somali families
affected by remittances cut off.
Until recently, Somali MTOs have been hugely reliant on a single bank, Merchants Bank of
California, to transfer funds abroad. Although OUS succeeded in delaying Merchants decision for
about six months, due to pressure from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Merchants Bank announced on January 27th, 2015, that it would terminate all of its Somali MTO
accounts on February 6th. This is a trend within the banking sector known as de-risking—
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avoiding high financial and reputational risks of violating Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and
Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regulations. Consequently, many Somali MTOs,
including the largest by volume and coverage, are planning to discontinue money transfers if the
account closures move forward as planned. While it is difficult to assess how much money
Somali-Americans will be able to send following the account closures, between $200m$400m/year could be at stake. MTOs could manage to continue their business based on a, for
example in the UK, wholesale MTOs who have existing accounts that MTOs with no accounts
can transfer money through. This is a vulnerable process as banks can still pressure those
wholesale MTOs to end business with MTOs with no accounts. Other means leaves diaspora
with illegal channels of transfer with no official oversight, usually costly and puts the sender’s
(diaspora) money at risk of fraud.
How was change achieved?
[Add a paragraph that presents the overarching timeline or phases of the work, and influencing
strategies for each phase. (Who were the targets, what was the change being sought, and how
did we hope to achieve it?) For example, there was a phase of awareness-raising, a phase to
support passage of the Remittance bill, another phase to influence Merchants’ bank, and there
was also work with treasury. You need to show how tactics and activities described here (and
evidence of their effectiveness) helped advance specific influencing strategies. Why did they do
the different activities? Did they have the effect they wanted? It’s more interesting to know the
result of the tactics than the counts of how many media hits or participants at events. ]
When OUS was requested to work on the remittances issue by partner organizations, OUS
tasked its Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor with exploring the possibilities to get involved in
the issue. OUS then commissioned further research to gain a comprehensive understanding of
remittances to Somalia and possible solutions resulting in the research report “Keeping the
Lifeline Open” in June 2013. OUS influencing work helped support the passage of the Money
Remittances Improvement Act of April 2014 co-sponsored by Rep Ellison (D-MN) and Rep. Smith
(D-WA). OUS also targeted the Treasury with influencing work. Social media turned out to be the
primary vehicle for engaging people, the diaspora in particular, to take actions directed at the
Treasury. According to the recent report by Oxfam, Hanging by a Thread, such pressure lead the
US government to take some modest but important steps help put Somali on a stronger
financial footing. OUS conducted a subsequent campaign spike targeted at Merchants bank
decision to close Somali MTO accounts in May 2014. The spike involved a petition, utilized social
media to inform the public audience, diaspora led events, panel discussions and individual
tactics such as the film on US of Somali families affected by remittances cut off.
OUS Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor Scott Paul travelled to Minnesota in May and
Somaliland in August 2012 to explore the root causes of the problem and potential for Oxfam
involvement. OUS then commissioned further research to gain a comprehensive picture of the
remittance issue and possible solutions culminating in the research report “Keeping the Lifeline
Open” in June 2013, which was co-branded with Adeso and Inter-American Dialogue, the
organization that conducted the research. The research aimed at providing evidence to how
remittances are crucial for Somali life, livelihood, and Somali economy and made clear
recommendations for US government, agencies, private banks, and MTOs. The report release
was accompanied by launch events in Washington, DC, Seattle, Minneapolis, Nairobi and the
UK. The report was widely distributed (OUS distributed 600 report copies and Adeso few
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hundred) and via email, including to key targets, including government officials, State
Department and USAID officers.

Scott Paul wrote four remittance blogs on Oxfam’s blog page, which had a combined 908 unique
page views and 360 shares during this period. Oxfam also hosted one event in Seattle and spoke
at two events in Minneapolis that were attended by members of the Somali Diaspora,
congressional staffers, Somali imams, community leaders and Representative. After the event in
Seattle, Jonathon Scanlon, Oxfam’s Senior Alliances Advisor, convinced Representative Adam
Smith (D-WA) staff to host a multi-stakeholder roundtable in which Oxfam participated. As a
result, Rep. Smith agreed to work with Ellison office on the remittance bill and became a cosponsor of the bill.
OUS engaged directly with executives from three target banks—Sunrise, US Bank and Wells
Fargo. OUS has also engaged with senior officials within the MTOs and industry associations
representing them on how to strengthen their business practices (compliance) and the industry
as a whole through collective action. OUS has been in discussions with approximately 25 MTO
officials including one at the CEO level, two global directors, 12 UK executives and 10 US
executives. Bank representatives attended the roundtable hosted by Rep. Smith in Seattle, WA.
The report positioned OI and OGB to lead on the issue in the UK, where Oxfam received
extensive media coverage for its work. A full link to all international media coverage on
remittances, including coverage outside the timeframe of this report can be found
here:https://sumus.oxfam.org/node/135140. The amount of positive local media coverage that
remittances generated was surprising. The ability to send remittances affects the diaspora on a
daily basis, and there are many great personal stories within the diaspora that highlights the
importance of remittances. It is easier to engage the diaspora on an issue that directly affects
them, and the report was a valuable tool for outreach.
Adeso has led outreach to the MTO Executives and contributed research conducted in Somalia.
It also created an infographic and disseminated information through its networks. Separate
from the spike, Adeso has also played a valuable role in liaising with MTO executives in Dubai.

What were the key lessons learned?
Lessons learned in this campaign and its subsequent spikes are drawn from interviews with
campaign staff, allies and partners and internal documents.
In the wake of the recent development in the issue of remittances with the MTO account
closures by Merchants on February 6th, it becomes apparent that getting a law passed is one
thing, but getting it implemented and its impact to be reflected on the affected population is
another. The Money Remittances Improvement Act seems to have little to no influence on
private bank decisions to disrupt remittances by closing MTO bank accounts. It also has not
facilitated the ability and capacity of nonbank financial institutions, such as money service
business, to remit money internationally.
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It is possible to develop the space to work on an issue at the request of partner organizations
and find internal support for it, even if a specific issue is not an Oxfam America priority, is
initially perceived as risky, or does not neatly sit within established work. The humanitarian
team was successfully able to solicit support and staff time from the Government Affairs, Private
Sector, Organizing and Alliances, Media, and Research teams, even though remittances is not an
agency priority.
The portrayal of partner organizations is crucial at external events. Adeso was barely mentioned
at the Hill launch event because it did not directly support the event, even though it was noted
as a sponsor of the paper. OUS also decided not to read the Somali Prime Minister’s and
researcher’s written statements because of a general sense that it would not be appropriate to
read written statements aloud. The effect of this decision was to further minimize the Adeso
partnership and Adeso’s role. Better communication about Adeso’s role in the event during the
planning process would have fostered a better relationship. In order for OUS practice to match
its rhetoric and desire to form Southern-based NGO partners, communication and collaboration
with Southern-based NGOs needs to encompass all phases of the project and the nature of the
relationship needs to be communicated clearly to other stakeholders in the organization.
It is necessary to thoroughly explain a partnership and previous work that originated in
collaboration with one affiliate to other affiliates as the partnership expands. The Adeso-OUS
partnership was originally confined to a single affiliate, which then expanded to include OGB.
The links with the country team were limited mainly because of a change of staff over a key
period of drafting the report. This meant the Oxfam in Somalia team did not give adequate input
into either the report or the relationship with Adeso, which would have helped to strengthen
the partnership at the outset.
One good practice that the campaign team learned that came out of the early outreach meeting
in the summer of 2013 is to share reports with stakeholders to get their input before the final
publication. Scott Paul sent copies of the draft report to some participants before an event in
Seattle and sought feedback. The feedback was helpful as Scott was updating the report. For the
new report that will be launched in mid February 2015, Scott sent a draft of the report to be
shared with communities in Seattle, Minneapolis, and Columbus.
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Appendix D

PROTOCOL for CASE STUDY SELF-ASSESSMENTS of NATIONAL LEVEL
POLICY INFLUENCING CAMPAIGNS and INITIATIVES (Protocol sections
only)
A case study of a policy influencing intervention will typically be a 20-40 page written
document, plus a short executive summary and an appendix containing relevant documents
(campaign plans, reports, campaign communications, examples of media coverage, etc.) and
list of sources (interviews, documents, literature, etc.)
The typical outline of a case study document:
Executive summary
Introduction
Context
Advocates
Policy
Politics
Strategy
Monitoring and
Evaluation Plans
Effectiveness

Outcomes

Contributions
Impact
Lessons learned

Brief overview of the campaign, including a timeline of events, and
description of the case study research process
Historical background and the major political, economic and social factors
that influenced the advocacy but were beyond the advocates’ control
Organizational capacity and resources
Problems that are being addressed, their causes, and the proposed changes
in laws, regulations or other policies, including the evidence for each
Visible and hidden policy making process and actors; direct and indirect
constituents; allies and internal champions; opponents
Theory of change; combination and sequence of influencing methods
(collaborative and/or confrontational)
Plans (including indicators), if any, for monitoring and evaluations of
process effectiveness, outcomes and impact
Assessment of the degree to which campaign and M&E plans were
effectively implemented/adjusted, including the various outputs, and
factors that influenced effectiveness
Progress toward or changes (if any) in policy and in power – including
changes in policy making processes, and capacity of civil society advocates
to protect policy changes and/or push for more
Process tracing analysis of the causal factors behind outcomes and
estimation of relative contribution of Oxfam and/or its partners
Actual or projected impact of the outcomes
Insights about aspects of the campaign plan and implementation that
resulted in success (or failure), with a focus on those that can inform future
advocacy

